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WHOSE BEHAVIOR IN WHAT 
HEAL TH MARKETPLACE? 
LEON S. ROBERTSON, Ph.D. 
Senior Behavioral Scientist 
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 
A number of behavioral scientists and health educators have 
been engaged for some time in attempts to explain and/or influence 
human behavior regarding health and illness. Behavior directed to-
ward preserving health is called health behavior.1 Behavior sub-
sequent to the perception of symptoms and directed toward diag-
nosis and treatment is called illness behavior. 2 
It has been suggested that techniques used to market products 
and services can be used to help individuals fulfill their needs in 
both prevention and amelioration of illness as well as in the allevia-
tion of other social problems. 3 In this paper I shall review some 
principles that have emerged from studies of health and illness be-
havior with special attention to their implications for the notion of 
health consumers in a health marketplace. The marketplace concept 
requires a focus on suppliers as well as consumers; therefore I shall 
attempt to explicate some important aspects of the roles of both 
consumers and suppliers in the health marketplace. The roles of 
behavioral scientists, educators and marketing specialists in this 
marketplace will also be considered along with some historicalles-
sons. 
Health and Illness Behavior 
Theories and research attempting to explain peoples' behavior 
wi th respect to health and illness have focused on: 
1. information available to people regarding illness and potential 
action to avoid illness, 
2. peoples' beliefs regarding the information, 
3. perception of personal vulnerability to particular diseases, and 
4. perceived or real cost and effort involved in the needed action to 
avoid or ameliorate the illness.4 
Although there are limits to the public's knowledge of potential 
health preserving actions, especially in areas of the world with lim-
ited public communication systems, substantial populations are at 
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least aware of many such potential actions. In countries with literate 
populations, persons who smoke heavily, drink heavily and travel in 
motor vehicles without using seat belts have at least heard that they 
are endangering their health. 
How strongly they believe the information is open to question 
but it is evident that many people deny their personal vulnerability. 
For example, when half of the respondents in one survey were asked 
to rate their own susceptibility to diseases such as tuberculosis and 
cancer, and the other half were asked to rate "others'" susceptibility, 
"others" consistently were rated as the more susceptible.s Denial of 
vulnerability in the presence of knowledge is nowhere more evident 
than among physicians. Although physicians more often know 
about the importance of early detection of cancer and that the prog-
nosis need not be fatal, they are found to delay seeking treatment 
about as often as the lay population. 6 
Failure to take action to protect health where people have knowl-
edge of potential danger and of available ameliorative actions is also 
sometimes the result of the costs in time, effort, money, or simple 
inconvenience involved in taking action. For example, discomfort 
and inconvenience were discovered to be important factors in the 
nonuse of seat belts in cars. 7 
Surveys regarding a wide variety of health related behaviors in-
dicate low individual consistency over the range of behaviors 
studied.8-10 The fact that people are inconsistent is not front page 
news. What is surprising to me is that persons acquainted with 
human resistance persist in the belief that major inroads in the pre-
vention and amelioration of a wide variety of human maladies can be 
accomplished by education, marketing or other attempts at changing 
diverse sets of behaviors in the general population. 
Behavior Change Strategies 
Attempts at changing health and illness behavior have been mar-
ginally successful at best and many have failed. In those studies with 
good experimental design, advertising - so widely used by mar-
keters in attempts to sell products - has been shown an abysmal 
failure in changing health behaviors. For example, a double-blind 
study of the effect of television messages on seat belt use was done 
on a split-cable television system used for real-world marketing 
studies. Six messages were produced, each directed at specific audi-
ences, on the basis of prior research. One was judged best and 
another in the top ten among public service entries of advertising 
clubs in Philadelphia and New York respectively. Each message was 
shown during programs appealing to audiences that were the targets 
of the messages. A total of 943 showings was presented on one cable 
of the dual cable system in a 9 month period - the equivalent of a $7 
million campaign on a national basis. 
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Belt use by drivers in their cars was checked daily by observers 
who were rotated among sites throughout the test city for 11 months, 
including one month prior to and one month subsequent to the tele-
vision campaign. Belt use observations were matched to experimen-
tal and control cables by matching vehicle license numbers to motor 
vehicle administration files, obtaining owner names and addresses, 
and subsequently matching these names and addresses to those in 
cable company files. The observers were not told the purpose of the 
study, and the people in the community did not know about the split 
cable system. This double-blind feature is a necessary precaution to 
prevent known biases that can occur. Comparison of belt use by 
drivers from households on the experimental and control cables, as 
well as those on neither cable, revealed that the television campaign 
had no effect on belt use. 
An experiment in three California communities was directed to-
ward changing heart-disease "risk factors" such as smoking and 
cholesterol. The study design allowed the comparison of: (1) a mul-
timedia campaign in one community, (2) that campaign plus inten-
sive personalized behavior modification among high risk persons in 
a second community, and (3) no treatment in the third control com-
munity. Results after the first year indicated effects of the media 
campaign alone of only a few percentage points compared to the 
control community.12 
The lack of substantial effect of mass communications should not 
be surprising to marketers. Most advertisers of products consider 
advertising successful if they obtain a few percent increase in a 
particular market. 13 Creating a market where none existed is usually 
very difficult. When the "product" is a behavior change from a pat-
tern established over many years by millions of people, the task is 
impossible within any reasonable bounds of media access. 
Recent studies of attempts at changing behavior of motor vehicle 
occupants raise serious doubts that mass attempts at manipulating 
individual behavior are nearly as easy or effective as is assumed by 
advocates of behavior modification. The U.S. Department of Trans-
portation issued a standard that required cars manufactured after 
January 1, 1972 for sale in the U.S. to have a buzzer-light system to 
be activated if the seat belt was not more than four inches from its 
normally stowed position when the car was in forward gear, as an 
optional alternative to passive restraints (those requiring no action). 
Except for a few thousand cars containing air bags that inflate au-
tomatically in severe crashes, absorbing damaging energy normally 
transferred to occupants, manufacturers chose to install the buzzer-
light system in approximately 15 million cars manufactured in 
1972-73, perhaps the most massive case of deliberately applied be-
havioral conditioning every attempted. Yet two studies involving 
unobtrusive observation of drivers in equipped and nonequipped 
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1972 vehicles showed no significant difference in belt use between 
these groups observed at the same- times and places. 14-1S A sub-
sequent federal standard, effective in 1974, required a belt system 
linked to the starter and seat sensors so that the car would not start 
unless belts were extended or latched. Belt use was increased signif-
icantly by this device, but over 40 percent of drivers had found ways 
to avoid using the belts only a few months after purchase of the 
cars. IS 
Before the advocates of behavioral conditioning rise to say that 
the best principles of conditioning were not applied, let me assure 
them that I know that, in classical experiments, intermittent rewards 
are more likely to evoke the desired behavior than punishment. But I 
do not think that belt use would have been increased substantially if 
a cookie had been coughed out of the dash board on an intermittent 
schedule when belts were used. Even if such a system would have 
some effect, I would not expect many owners to replenish the cookie 
supply. The point is that the application of behavioral conditioning 
on a large and sustained basis is a difficult and costly business even 
if people do not rebel. Complaints to Congress about the buzzer and 
starter interlock system resulted not only in repeal of those standards 
but standards requiring passive restraints were placed in jeopardy 
(Congressional Record, 1974). At last count, belt use in interlock 
equipped cars was 33 percent in urban areas. 16 
More personalized approaches to health behavior change have 
been more successful, although hardly spectacularly so. In the 
three-community California study, the community with the com-
bined media and personalized approach for persons at "high risk" of 
heart disease had a 23 percent reduction in claimed smoking be-
havior relative to the control community and a 3 percent reduction 
in average serum cholesterol among those at "high risk" while 
cholesterol was increasing slightly among "high risk" persons in the 
control group.12 
Other controlled experiments have produced similar results 
without the mass media approach. Increased visits to a cervical 
cytology clinic occurred among urban ghetto residents visited by a 
resident of the community who explained the various aspects of 
vulnerability, the importance of early detection, the testing proce-
dure and the time and place of a free clinic. A control group received 
discussion of another health matter and incidental mention of the 
free clinic. Both groups were offered free baby sitting and free trans-
portation to the clinic. It is of interest to note that visits to the clinic 
were not related to changes in perceived vulnerability to cervical 
cancer as measured by questionnaires during a preceding and sub-
sequent interview. And, although more women in the experimental 
group than in the control group obtained examinations, more than 
half of the experimental group did not obtain an examination.17 
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Similar increases in preventive measures were found when 
families were provided personalized comprehensive pediatric care 
where it had not been available. Experimental and control groups of 
families without a regular physician were randomly assigned from 
patients using a hospital emergency room. The experimental 
families were offered a regular physician to provide both preventive 
and illness care while the control groups continued to receive care 
episodically from emergency rooms, outpatient departments and 
private physicians. After three years the children's immunization 
records, tuberculin testing, and use of fluoride were significantly 
higher in the experimental group. However, questionnaire indi-
cators of general attitudes regarding health had not changed among 
the mothers.1s 
These findings suggest that personalized approaches have some 
benefits although we don't know exactly why they work. Since per-
ceived vulnerability and attitudes apparently were not changed, 
even in those cases where behavior did change, we need to revise 
either our measuring instruments or our theories of behavior. A mar-
keting researcher has expressed a similar view regarding buyer be-
havior. Reviewing research on the subject, he concluded that no 
specified sequence of knowledge, attitude, and belief changes ac-
companies individual adoption of a product. 19 It is doubtful that 
marketers know any more about changing behavior than do be-
havioral scientists and educators. 
Even where we know how to change at least some people's be-
havior, there are severe limitations to such strategies on a mass basis. 
To provide personalized behavior modification or counseling to 
every vulnerable person on the large variety of potential di,seases 
and injuries and the known means of avoiding them would require 
an army of knowledgeable counselors and an accompanying budget 
that is unsupportable in any foreseeable economy. Fortunately 
strategies that do not require mass individual behavior changes are 
available to reduce disease and injury substantially. 
Alternative Strategies 
Public health strategies that require individuals to take special 
action to protect themselves are called "active" strategies while 
those that work automatically, irrespective of human behavior, are 
called "passive" strategies.2O- 21 If I may put the matter rhetorically, 
which are the more effective? If faced with the choice today, would 
we treat our water to eliminate harmful bacteria at the source of 
supply or would we launch an advertising campaign to persuade 
people to boil their water? Would we require milk suppliers to pas-
teurize milk or would we send an army of health educators out to 
teach people to heat their milk to kill bacteria? 
Somehow in recent years we have forgotten the lessons of history 
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and have defined current health problems as behavioral problems. 22 
In its worst form this definition has taken a moralistic, blame-
assignment tone as in the phrase "self-inflicted" used to refer to the 
harmful results of cigarettes, alcohol, and motor vehicle crashes. 
To my knowledge there has seldom if ever been a disease or 
injury where human behavior was not involved in exposure and/or 
susceptibility.23 But the reductions of many of the maladies that no 
longer plague us were attained without changing the individual be-
haviors of large numbers of people. They were often reduced au-
tomatically by passive strategies - water treatment, pasteurization, 
iodized salt, shielded electrical cables, automatic fire sprinklers. 
Failure to control many current health problems is at least partly 
the result of failure to recognize the range of sources of damage and 
the range of options available to control the damage. 24-25 If we must 
persist in the notion of a "health market plac~," the suppliers of 
damaging agents deserve at least as much attention as the consumers 
of damage. For example, the recent reduction in motor vehicle re-
lated deaths associated with the imposition of 55 mile per hour 
speed limits has led many people to believe that greater emphasis on 
this and other aspects of driving behavior is the best strategy to 
reduce 10sses.26 However, consider the thousands of lives that would 
have been prolonged had vehicles capable of speeds greater than 55 
miles per hour never been manufactured for any but emergency pur-
poses, not to mention the savings in fuel and raw materials. From the 
earliest days of the automobile, there were warnings of the damaging 
consequences of increasing speed capability but the warnings were 
unheeded.27 
It is becoming increasingly evident that many hazards to health 
in industrialized countries are the result of lack of knowledge or 
concern on the part of those who place those hazards or allow them 
to be placed in our environment. Man-made agents in foods, drugs, 
water and air are suspected or known to cause or exacerbate cancers 
and various other diseases. Machines, tools, work places, dwellings, 
recreational facilities and products, and transportation facilities and 
products are often designed with little or no attention to the hazards 
they pose to users. 
Consider a few examples in the area of motor vehicle injuries. 
Vehicles are incapable of sufficiently protecting occupants from 
crash forces that can be generated from their designed-in speed 
capabilities. Sharp points and edges on exteriors injure pedestrians, 
bicyclists and motorcyclists. Our roadsides are lined with rigid, 
often man-made, structures that maim and kill occupants of the ve-
hicle which strays a few inches or feet from the roadway, structures 
that would be seen as obvious hazards if similarly placed along 
airport runways. 
The active strategies that attempt to inform every person about 
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such hazards and behaviors to avoid them are not only unrealistic in 
terms of what we know about the hazards and the behaviors, they 
divert attention and efforts from the passive strategies that have 
greater likelihood of success. If for no other reason than the numbers 
of people involved, changing the knowledge and behaviors of a few 
tens, hundreds or thousands of designers, producers, and suppliers 
is more probable than changing the knowledge and behaviors of 
millions upon millions of consumers. 
Roles and Responsibilities 
Too often the discussion of these issues is reduced to the ques-
tion of who is to blame. It is clear that some human damage occurs 
from use of products by consumers in ways not intended by the 
products' designers and producers. It is equally clear that some de-
signers and producers have knowingly marketed hazardous prod-
ucts. The liability of any of these persons is a matter for the courts to 
settle. Even if a product is misused, to neglect efforts to protect the 
user as well as others who may be involved is not the mark of either 
humane responsible societies or governmental executives. 
Liability is an issue that should directly concern the health pro-
fessional only when involvement in questions of liability may result 
in reduced hazards. Our concern, whether as scientists, educators or 
marketers, is to identify and attempt to change those factors that are 
most amenable to reduction of human damage. If we are negligent in 
considering the full range of options available to ameliorate damage, 
then we must share in the blame for that damage. 
It is understandable that anyone possessed of certain skills and 
concerned with health matters would want to apply those skills to 
ameliorate health problems. Behavioral scientists want to study be-
havior, educators want to educate, and marketers want to market. 
However, we have too often become promoters of points of view and 
techniques rather than seekers after solutions to problems. For 
example, three generations of behavioral scientists, educators and 
others working in "highway safety" were active parties in promoting 
an almost sole emphasis on changing drivers to avoid "accidents". 
Only rarely did any of these point out the severe limitations of such 
an approach,27 and many now resent the increasingly successful 
current efforts to require less damaging vehicles and environments. 
This is not to say that behavioral scientists, educators, and mar-
keters have no role to play in the amelioration of current public 
health problems. From behavioral scientists we need better studies 
on the decision making processes in both private and public organi-
zations that lead to increase or decrease in hazards to health. 23 When 
problems are ill-defined as behavioral problems, behavioral scien-
tists must be more honest than many have been about the prospects 
of changing the behavior of large numbers of people. When behavior 
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change or other strategies are attempted, we should insist on the 
most rigorous scientific research into their effectiveness and unan-
ticipated consequences. 
Educators must also be aware of the limitations of educating 
everyone on the numerous and diverse hazards to health. Diverting 
money and effort into large scale health education programs when 
alternative strategies would be more effective is counterproductive. 
Educational efforts based on impeccably sound information should 
be directed to those persons whose decisions contribute to the 
hazards or fail to contribute to their amelioration. Some producers 
and suppliers of hazards are unaware of the consequences and will 
withdraw or change products when so informed. Even if the deci-
sions are not changed as a result of the education, the decision maker 
cannot plead ignorance and, in many cases, may be legally liable for 
knowingly contributing to or allowing hazardous conditions. 28 
Marketers have often been actively involved in marketing 
hazardous products. Some marketing firms refuse to sell products 
such as cigarettes, but most will take any account; many fight any 
attempt to restrict what they can say or do to promote such products. 
Sometimes products have been made more hazardous or less advan-
tageous to health to make them more saleable. It seems to me that the 
first priority of marketers interested in public health would be to 
change the behavior of their colleagues, and marketing professors 
could educate their students regarding the consequences of such 
marketing practices. 
We all have roles to play in improving public health. By careful 
consideration of the options available for particular improvements, 
we can see more clearly where our contributions can be made and 
avoid those roles that are more hindrance than help. 
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